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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
E. L. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LE\\~S Y. TRUE1IAN, Judge of the 
Second Judicial District of the State 
of Utah; JOSEPH HOLBROOK, 
Sheriff o f Dans County, U t a h; 
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy 
Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah; 
David F. Smith, Commissioner of 
Agriculture of the State of Utah; and 
C. G. McCULLOUGH, Deputy In-
·spector of the Utah State Commission 
of Agriculture, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, E. L. Allen, is now and for some 
time past has been engaged in the business of sell-
ing milk and cream products. He maintains and 
operates a place of business. on the east side of 
Highway No. 91 in Davis 1County, ~utah, imme·-
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diately north of the Salt Lake- Davis County line, 
at which place he sells milk and cream .products 
at retail over the counter. 
In the conduct and operation of plaintiff's busi-
ness, he has acquired both by purcha:se and ex-
change over the counter in the course of his retail 
trade, various types of milk and cream bottles, hi~· 
practice being to require of his customers that they 
bring their own bottle either to have filled or to ex-
change over the counter for each bottle owned by 
plaintiff delivered to them over the counter; or if 
the customer does not bring his own bottle, that he 
pay a deposit for each bottle taken out. 
In the delivery of milk in Halt Lake City and 
adjacent territory, it has been the cus.tom for many 
years preceding the filing of plaintiff's petition, that 
when milk is: delivered in refillable glass :nhllk con-
tainers by any dairy Oli distributor to the doorstep 
of a residence customer,. or to a hotel or restaurant, 
that the dairy or distributor so delivering said milk 
has not required of its customers that they l)ay any 
deposit for any bottles left with them. The prac-
tice has also been that such dairies or distributors 
who had a wholesale trade, and who would deliver 
their milk and cream to stores and other wholesal~ 
outlets, would not require of such stores or other 
wholesale outlets that they secure a deposit for the 
return of such re:fillable glass bottles as were de-
Jivered by such stores to their retail trade. 
Petitioner and one Ezra M. Peterson have been 
:the only individuals or concernR selling milk and 
cream in refiliable g-lass bottles who have required a 
deposit for bottles delivered to cnstomerR, when no 
bottlers of the customer have been given in exchange. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Not only have other dairies and distributors failed 
to require a deposit to guarantee the return of their 
bottles, but such dairies and distributors have not 
in any way required that their customer8 be respon-
sible for the bottles delivered to them, nor that such 
customers be obliged in any manner to account for 
such bottles as they may fail or neglect to return: to 
the dairy or distributor who ha'S delivered bottles 
to them. 
As a re'Sult of this practice, the bottles bearing 
the marks or names of the various dairies have been 
indiscriminatelv di'Stributed over the whole Salt 
Lake area a:rld "'customers have been in the habit of 
taking bottles from various dairies and exchanging 
them at stores when they buy milk at stores, and 
have also been in the pra~ice of taking bottles from 
one dairy or bottles that they receive at stores, and 
returning thase bottles to the dairies delivering milk 
to such customers at their door step, and as a result 
of the indiscriminate practice of distributing of bot-
tles around in this manner, the public ha·s acquired 
the practice of taking any bottle and exchanging it 
at any place, store or dairy they might choose to deal 
with whenever they buy milk or cream products. 
As a result of this practice, and as a result of the 
failure of the various dairies to require their bottles 
to be delivered back to them by their customers, a 
very large number of bottles of every description 
and trade mark continue to circulate among the pub-
lic generally; and the public, including the customers 
of plaintiff, assumes that in the buying of milk at 
any store, they need only to take a bottle for ex-
change regardle'ss of the type of bottle they may 
have. Because of this practice, it ha:s been difficult 
not only for plaintiff, but for other dairies to retain 
bottleH purchased by them, and bottles of other dai-
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ries have because of such practice been exchanged 
over the counter, and have been acquired by plaintiff 
in exchange for bottle·s purchased frorn supply 
houses and other sourees by plaintiff. 
For a considerable length of time prior to the 
filing of plaintiff's petition, there have been oper-
ated, by two different groups or dairies in Salt Lake 
.City, two separate bottle exchanges, and in connec-
tion with said exchanges, it has been the practice for 
dairies or distributors with trade marked bottles to 
take to one or the other of such exchanges bottles 
bearing trade marks other than their own, and to 
receive from such exchange therefor approximately 
one cent per bottle, and also to receive from such 
bottle exchange bottles bearing that dairy's own 
trade mark, upon paying therefor 1.3 cents per bot-
tle. These exchanges have been operated by the 
various dairies and distributors using trade marked 
bottles, and for their exclusive benefit, and no pro_ 
vision has been made by said exchanges or any of 
~aid dairies or distributors to exchange bottles upon 
any fair or equitable basis with any dairy or dis-
tributor who did not have a trade marked bottle. 
The various dairies and distributors who are 
members of said bottle exchanges do not bring to said 
exchanges any plain or unmarked bottles which may 
come into their possession; and if any dairy ur diii-
tributor who does not have a trade mark of his own 
but uses plain bottles, brings to the bottle exchange 
bottles which have come into his possession bearing 
the trade marks of other dairies or distributors, he 
will be paid therefor only approximately one cent 
per bottle, and the exchange will have no bottle·s to 
return to him for 1.3 cents~ per bottle, or for any 
other price. 
The petitioner has no trade mark of his own, but 
ha~ purchased and used numerous plain hottles and 
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oth~r bottles with marks and brands which have not 
been registered. These bottles cost approximatPly 
8 cents each, and by exchange of these bottles over 
the counter, petitioner has -.(quired various bottl~s 
bearing the trade marks which have been registered 
by other dairies or distributors; and the various dai-
ries and distributors have reque"Sted that petitioner 
bring these trade marked bottles to the bottle ex-
change and turn them over to the exchange for ap-
proximately 1 cent per bottle, with no offer of any 
plain or other bottles for 1.3 cents, or for any other 
price. 
The various dairies and especially the larger 
dairie'S, who have established trade marks on their 
bottles, have, in spite of the indiscriminate distrib_ 
uting of their bottles and the paying to the bottle ex-
change for recovery thereof, continued to claim own-
ership of the "Same wherever they may be located, 
whether in the hands of the bottle exchange or stores 
or individual members of the buying public; and in 
order to recover the po·ssession of bottles bearing 
their trade marks, they have called upon the crimi-
nal authorities, and the law enforcement author-
ities of the State to a:ssist in reclaiming· 
the bottles which they have allowed to be indiscrimL 
natdy distributed to the public generally. 
During the month of December, 1938, at the in-
stigatio::l of some of the larger dairie·s using trade 
mrrrked bottles in Salt Lake City, and pursuant to 
Section 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, a 
search and seizure warrant was is·sued by Fred Lind-
beck, Justice of the Peace for the Third Precinct of 
Salt Lake County, under which search and seizure 
warrant 366 milk and cream bottles were taken from 
petitioner, and a hearing was scheduled to de-
termine the ownership thereof. Petitioner im-
mediately secured a writ of prohibition from this 
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Court, and after a hearing thereon this Honor-
able Court held such ·statute to be unconstitutional. 
'That case is entitled, 
.bJ. L. Allen v. :b'red Lindbeck, et al, and is 
reported in .. Utah, .. ; 93 .Pac. (2d) 920. 
While that case was pending in this Uourt, and even 
beiore argument thereon, the larger dairies in Balt 
Lake City secured the passage of an Amendment to 
the Trade Mark Statute by the State Legislature, and 
:5uch Amendment now appears asChap.110,Page 144, 
Session Laws of 1939. Not only was Section 95-2-10 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, amended, but two 
other sections of Chapter 2, Title 95 were amended. 
Section 95-2-10 as amended by Chapter 110, 
Page 144, Ses~.;ion Laws of 1939, read::; 
as follows: 
"95-2-10. WRONGFUL USE,_ SEARCH 
A N D SEIZURE - PROCEDURE 
AFTER: SEIZURE. 
Any person may make affidavit before a 
court of competent jurisdiction that he ha·s 
reason to believe, and does believe, setting 
forth the facts upon which such belief is 
· based that any receptacle, container, car-
rier, box, equipment or supplies bearing or 
having ·stamped, impressed or produced 
thereon, the name, mark, brand or device, 
claim to which has been filed and published 
as provided by law, is, or are, in the pos-
session of any person other than the owner 
thereof in violation of the provisious of any 
statute or that any such receptacle, con-
tainer, carrier, box, equipment or supplies 
is, or are ·secreted in .any,place specified in 
such affidavit. The court may thereupon ex-
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amine on oath the complainant and any wit-
nes'Ses that may be produced or subpoenaed 
and take their depo'Sitions in writing. If it 
shall appear from the affidavit or from the 
affidavit and deposition or depositions 
that there is probable cause to believe 
that any such property is unlawfully pos-
sessed or secreted as aforesaid, the court 
shall issue a search and seizure warrant 
for such property. 
The warrant shall be directed generally 
to any peace officer of the State of Utah 
and shall require him to take such prop-
erty intc;·his po'Ssession and hold the same 
subject to the order of the court. 
Any peace officer to whom such warrant 
is delivered shall execute the same in the 
daytime anywhere within the State, Pro-
vided, that if the warrant is issued out of 
a justice of the peace court it may not 
be executed outside the county in which 
the issuing court sits unless the county 
clerk of that county shall first ~dorse 
thereon his certificate that the ·signature 
affixed to the warrant is the true sig-
nature of the person who is duly qualified 
and acting as justice of the peace of the 
issuing court. 
If the officer when executing the warrant 
finds there is contained in any receptacle 
or other container seize'd by him under 
the warrant any personal property of such 
nature that it can be _handled only in recep-
tacles or containers, the officer may take 
such property with the rece-ptacles de-
scribed in the warrant and hold the same 
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until the per;:;on from whose possession it 
was taken produces other receptacles or 
containers to receive it and then demands 
its return or the officer may at his option 
furnish receptacles or containers for re-
ceiving ·such property and deliver the same 
to such person. In the latter case, the 
person to whom such receptacles or con-
tainers are furnished shall redeliver the 
same to the officer within forty-eight hours 
of his receipt thereof and shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor for a ·willful or negligent 
failure so to do. 
When the officer takes the property pur-
suant to the warrant he shall give a de-
tailed receipt therefor to the person found 
in po·ssession thereof or if no such person 
is found he shall leave such receipt in the 
place in which the property is found. After 
taking the property into his possession 
the officer must forthwith return the war-
rant to the court with a written inventory 
of the property seized thereunder. 
Upon the filing of the officer's return the 
court shall order him to hold the prop-
erty seized pursuant to the warrant until 
otherwise ordered by the court. The court 
shall thereupon give notice of a hearing:tO'be 
held to determine the right to the possession 
of said property. Notice of ·said hearing 
shall be given by posting notice of such 
hearing at the place where said property 
was seized and notice shall be served upon 
the person, if known, from who·se pos-
session the property was taken by the offi-
cer seizing the same. Notice shall also be 
served upon the ownrr of ·said property 
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as shown by the records of the secretary 
of State and upon such other persons as 
the court shall have rea'Son to believe have 
any interest in the seized property. 
At the hearing any person appearing and 
asserting any interest in writing to any of 
the seized property, shall be made a party 
defendant. The court shall then proceed 
to the trial of the i'Ssues as made by the 
claims of the parties to said action and 
shall determine the party en'titled to pos-
session of smd property and shall order 
the retV,n of ·same to said party.'' 
Pnrsua.hflto this amended Section 10, and upon 
affidavit of C. G. McCullough, a deputy of the 
Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Utah, 
a search and seizure warrant was issued by the de. 
fendant Judge Lewis V. Trueman, on or about the 
26th day of July 1939; and pursuant to said search 
and seizure warrant, the sheriff of Davis County 
searched petitioner's place of business and took 
therefrom 724 refillable milk and cream bottles 
bearing various regi·stered trade marks. Sub-
sequent to the return of the sheriff upon said 
search warrant, a warrant of attachment was issued 
by the defendant Judge Lewis V. Trueman, direct-
ing the sheriff to bold ·said bottles, and the County 
Clerk of Da,-is County issued a notice directing 
that all persons claiming any title or ~nterest in 
said bottles should file a claim on or before: August 
19, 1939, the date which was set for a hearing upon 
the sole question of the right to the posses·sion of 
~aid bottles. 
Petitioner has at all times insi·sted that he has 
an ownership interest in said bottles and a right to 
have a hearing in connection with the same in an 
action properly instituted for such purpo·se, rather 
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than in a criminal action or quasi criminal action 
based upon a search and seizure warrant. 
At the time the bottles were seized from plain-
tiff's place of business, the plaintiff was not re-
quired to accompany the officer or to appear be-
fore the court, nor was anyone else at plaintiff\:; 
place of business requested to accompany the 
,-,fficer with the bottles. No arrest of the plaintiff 
·was Inade or contemplated, and no action of any 
nature, either criminal or otherwise, was filed 
against plaintiff either to determine the ques-
tion as to whether he had violated thEi pro-
visions of Chapter 2, Title 95, or otherwi~se. The 
sole purpose of the search and seizure proceeding's 
as instituted, and everything done in iCO.nnection 
therewith and the further proceedings threatened 
by the defendants, was and is to determine the civil 
question of the right to the possession of said re-
fillable milk and cream bottles. 
Claims were filed in the District Court tsl ar-
Farmington by Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & :Mabey1 
as attorneys for the various dairies who had re-
ceived notice that among the 724 bottles were bot-
tle-s bearing their trade marks, and the defendants 
were intending to proceed with the hearing upon 
the question of the right to possession of said 
'bottles. 
Upon this ·state of facts, the plaintiff made 
application for the writ of prohibition herein, upon 
the grounds that the amended statute under which 
the defendantf: were proceeding is unconstitutional 
and void. 
An alternative writ of prohibition was issued, 
and by way of return thereto, attorneys F'abian, 
Clendenin, Moffat & :Mabey, on behalf of the de-
fendants Lewis V. Trueman, Joseph Holbrook and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Calvin G. R-oberts, filed a general dmnurrer to 
plaintiff's petition applying for the writ, and also 
filed a lengthy answer, which raises no issue of 
(fact although it contains a rather lengthy nar-
rati'e of facts which are admitted by all parties. 
The only issue raised by the demurrer and answer 
is one of law with respect to the constitutionality 
of the statute invol,ed. The other defendants 
have failed to answer or make any return to the 
writ as issued. 
BASIS OF APPLICA'riON FOR WRIT AND 
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION 
The plaintiff in seeking the writ of prohibi-
tion insists that the defendant Judge Lewi·s V. 
Trueman was proceedng in excess of the jurisdic-
tion vested in him, and that the search warrant, 
as issued, and the search and ·seizure made there-
under, was entirely illegal and void, for the follow-
ing reasons : 
1. 
That Section 95-2-10, Revised States of Utah, 
L933, as amended by Chap. 110, p. 144, Utah Laws 
of 1939, is unconstitutional and illegal and void, in 
that it violates the provisions of Section 14 of 
~~rticle- I of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
and that such a search and seizure a'S is provided 
therein is, and would be, an unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
2. 
That the said statute violates the provrsions of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, in that said 
~tatute denies to this plaintiff th~ equal protec-
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12 
tion of the laws and the privilege·s and immunitied 
granted to him as a citizen of the United States . 
. , 
o). 
':l_1hat said statute is further null and void in 
that it is not intended to, and does not, promote the 
publio health, rmorats, safety or· welfare, but 
amounts to special legislation in favor of a certain 
,~roup or clasf, of individuals in that it grants to 
them the right to use the criminal authorities of 
the State of Utah and criminal procedure in the 
recovery of personal property claimed by them, 
instead of leaving them to the usual civil remedy 
for the recovery of ·such property .by- replevin or 
claim and delivery, and is therefore contrary to 
and in violation of Section 24 of Article I, and sub-
paragraph 16 of Section 26 of Article VI of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
-!. 
rrhat the statute is arbitrary and constitutes 
an unreasonable classification and denies to plain-
tiff the equal protection of the laws in violation of 
the provisions of both the Constitution of the 
United States and of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
5. 
That said ·statute violates the provisions of 
Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, in that it offends against the con-
stitutional rights given to plaintiff, with ot4er 
citizens, to acquire, posses·s and enjoy property; 
no question of police power, public health, morals, 
safety or general welfare being concerned. 
6. 
The said statute allows the i·ssuance of a search 
"..-arrant by a court upon an affidavit based merely 
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13 
upon information and belief, and without requiring 
the judge who issues the warrant to find probable 
cause therefor, and in fact takes away the power 
lor neceS'Sity of the judge. to find probable cause, 
and is therefore an unreasonable search and seiz-
ure in violation of Section 14, Article I of th~ Con-
stitution of the State of Utah. . 
7. 
That said statute is unconstitutional and the 
proceedings thereunder illegal stnd void because 
the said statute violates Section 7, of Article 1, of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States, by depriving plaintiff of hh; 
property without due process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
'THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE INVOLVED 
HEREIN IS AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, AND THE STATUTE 
AUTHORIZING IT IS THEREFORE VOID. 
It has been the contention of petitioner all 
through the proceedings connected with this con· 
troversy, that regardless of the property rights or 
the rights to possession of the type of property de-
scribed in this trade mark law, that tho·se rights 
should be tested in proper civil actions, and that 
the use of the criminal procedure of search and 
seizure for the maintenance of a mere civil and prL 
vate right is violative of Federal and State consti-
tutional rights, and that, therefore, a statute auth-
orizing the same is void. 
As. will appear from the authorities herein-
after cited, the great weight of authority through-
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out the whole country has long been to the effect 
that search warrants m2-y issue only when the pub-
lic interest i~ involved, and are not available to 
individuals for the n1aintenance of any mere pri-
vate right. 
Such warrants were not known to the early 
common law. Their use was at first confined to 
the search for stolen goods. They were later ex-
tended somewhat and became rather notorious 
under the denomination of ·Writs of Assistance in 
the earlier colonial days. These Writs of Assi·3t-
ance became so oppressive that the framers of our 
Constitution put provi·sion therein that the people 
should be secure against unreasonable searche's 
and seizures, and the clauses in the F,ederal 
and State Constitutions prohibiting' unreasonable 
searches and ·seizures have always been looked 
upon as of high value to the citizen. 
As is stated by the eminent Judge Cooley in 
his work on Constitutional Limitations: 
''Search warrants are a ·species of pro-
cess exceedingly arbitrary in character and 
which ought not to be resorted to except 
for very urgent and satisfactory reasons.'' 
And that, 
''search warrants are .always obnoxious to 
very serious objections; and very great 
particularity i·s justly required in these 
cases before the privacy of a man '·s prem-
ises is allowed to be invaded by the min-
ister of the law." 
In Cooley's Work on Torts, we read concern-
ing such warrants that 
"The authority to issue them i~ lia hl0 to 
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great abuse and the law is justly strict re-
garding their requirements.'' 
It is the contention of plaintiff that Chapter 
2 of Title 95, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and 
particularly Section 10 thereof, both as appeared 
originally and as now amended by the 1939 Legi~­
l:lture and appearing in Chapter 110, 1939 Session 
Laws, was enacted solely for the benefit and pro-
tection of civil rights of a certain group or class 
of individuals, and wa'S placed upon our statute 
books at the request and insistence of certain in-
terests having a selfish motive in view. 
There has long been on the 'Statute books of 
this State, general statutes with regard to search 
and seizure, and these general statutes appear in 
the Revised Edition of 1933 as Chapter 54 of 
Title 105. In addition to that general statute re-
garding search and seizure we have other statutes 
regarding food products under the jurisdiction of 
the State Department of Agriculture. In Section 
22, Chapter 10 of Title 3, and the amendments 
thereto, is set out provisions requiring containers 
used in the sale or delivery of milk and cream pro-
ducts to be clean, and subsequent sections therein 
;provide that the violation of that provision is a 
misdemeanor. In Section 8, Chapter 10 of Titl~ 
3, there is provision against the adulteration of 
drugs and foods, and in Section 33, Chapter 10 of 
Title 3, and subsequent sections, there is provided 
a method for search and seizure of adulterated or 
misbranded food or drug products. Thus there 
wa·s no necessity for the provisions made in Sec-
tion 95-2-10, either as originally enacted or as 
amended by the 1939 Session Laws, ~xcept for thP 
fact that it allowed a certain group of people to 
use the arm of the State and the criminal author-
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ities and procedure of the State to recover a cer-
tain class of personal property. The fact that this 
is not only the intent of the statute but the con-
druction placed upon it by those seeking its en-
forcement, is borne out by the notice of the hear-
ing '~chedulcd after the rGtu1n of the sheriff upon 
the warrant, which show~; that the only purpose of 
the hearing was to determine the right to posses-
sion of the bottles. 
This is further borne out by the fact that nei-
ther by the provisions of the law as amended, nor 
iby the proceedings taken or contemplated by th(~ 
defendants, was there any suggestion of the filing 
of a criminal charge against petitioner in connec-
tion with the ·search and seizure of the bottles. All 
that they were concerned with was the recovery of 
the possession of the personal property. 
In the case of 
State v. Derry, 85 N.E. 765, 
the Supreme Court of Indiana, in discussing the 
•ser"rch '"Tarrant statute involved, said: 
''This statute is ~mstaint>d under the Fed-
eral Constitution forbidding unreasonable 
search and seizure, only as a nece-ssary 
means in the suppression of crime and the 
detection and punishment of criminals, 
and is required to be cautiously framed 
and strictly construed. Neither at com-
mon law, nor under the statute, is such 
process available to individuals in the 
course of civil proceedings, nor for the 
maintenance of any mere private right. 
It may only be invoked in the furtherance 
of public prosecutions.'' 
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In the case of 
People ex rel Robert Simpson .Company 
v. Kempner, 101 N. E. 794, 
a New York Court, speaking of the search war-
rant, stated: 
''Its legitimate use is, and always has 
been, to aid in the detection and punish-
ment of crime . . . . '' 
''It thus appears with rea'Sonable certainty 
that in England and the American colonies 
the search warrant was a process used 
preparatory to the discovery of felons, in 
preparing evidence again'St them, and to 
help persons robbed to recover their 
goods, and not to try the title of or right 
to the possession of goods and chattels. 
There did not exist at the time of the 
adoption of our State constitution in 1777, 
any right by the common or statute law 
of England and Great Britain, to try the 
title to goods and chattels before a magis-
trate upon the return of a search war-
rant. Such right did not form a part of 
the law of the Colony of New York on the_ 
19th day of April, in the year of our Lord 
1775 ... " 
''There is nothing in any of the provisions 
of the Code I of Criminal Procedure that 
authorizes a trial of the title to or pos-
session of the property taken under the 
warrant.'' 
''Search warrants were never recognized 
by the common law as processes which 
might be availed of by individuals in the 
course of civil proceedings, or for the 
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maintenance of any mere private right; 
but their use was confined to cases of pull-
lie prosecutions, instituted and pu:.:·sued 
for the suppres·sion of crime or the de-
tection and punislunent of criminals ... " 
''All se.arches therefore, which are insti-
tuted and pursued upon the complaint or 
suggestion of one party into the house or 
possessions of another, in order to secure 
a personal adv1antage and not wit"M any 
design to afford .aid in the administration 
of justice in reference to acts or offenses 
in violation of penal laws, must be held to 
be unreasonable, and consequently under 
our constitution, unu'arrantable, illegal and 
void.'' (Italic·s ours). 
''Where property voluntarily or by aid of 
a search warrant comes into the posses-
sion of a magistrate or co'Urt from thP 
person or posse-ssion of one charged with 
crime, and such person is thereafter con-
victed of having stolen the pro1,erty that 
is ·so in the posse0sion of the magistTate 
or court from the person chiming to be 
the owner thereof, and there are no third 
persons claiming such property, it haP-
doubtless been the practice, so long as there 
i·s any record of it, to order the property 
delivered to the person who, as appears by· 
the testimony taken upon the trial, rs the 
owner thereof. Such an order is analogous 
to the obsolete writ of restitution. When, 
however, the property has been taken by 
a ·search warrant from the possession of 
a third person, and there is a controversy 
between the person from whom it is 
claimed that the property was stolen ann 
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the person fron1 whom the posse-ssion of 
property was taken by the search warrant, 
as to which is entitled to the possession 
thereof, a question is presented that can-
not be determined upon a crimina] process. 
It is a. matter wholly between the contend-
ing parties, and of no direct concern to the 
State. It must be determined in a civil 
action .... '' 
To the same effect see the case of 
State v. District Court, 224 Pac. 862 (Mont.) 
See also, 
Briggs v. Shepard Manufacturing Com-
pany, 105 N. E. 622 (Mass.J 
At this point, it will be interesting and instructive 
to note one or two differences between the amended 
statute and the original Section 95-2-10 of the R~ 
vised Statutes of 1933, which was declared uncon-
~titutional by this Court. 
The original Section 10, as it appeared in 
Chapter 2, Title 95 of the 1933 Revised Statutes. 
did have -some semblance of a criminal proceeding, 
or seemed to require a criminal proceeding in con-
nection with and as a part of it. That original rsec-
tion provided that when the officer seized any re-
ceptacles under the search warrant, he should also 
"bring before such court the person in whose pos-
SE.~::;sion such receptacle, container, carrier, box, 
equipment or supplies may be found, and if it shall 
be adjudged that such person ha:s been guilty of a 
violation of this Chapter, the court shall award 
possession of such property to the owner thereof.'' 
The phrase ''and if it ·shall be adjudged that 
such person has been guilty of a violation of thh: 
'Chapter," presupposes that there should be a 
criminal charge against and a determination a·s to 
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whether the person in possession has been guilty 
l(•f a misdemeanor because of son1e violation of the 
provi·sions of the Chapter. The new section, as 
,amended and as appearing on page 144 of the Law.:; 
of 1939, bas no requirenwnt that the person in 
whose posse:ssion the receptacles may be found, be 
brought before the court, and ha·s no hint or sug-
ge·stion of any criminal cha.rge or hearing or ad-
judication as to the possessors being guilty of any 
violation of Chapter 2, Title 95, or of any other 
criminal statute. It is thus entirely shorn of any 
semblance to a criminal action, but by its very 
terms is merely an extension of a criminal remedy 
·-that of ·search and seizure- to and for the ben_ 
efit of a group of individuals for the maintenance 
of a mere civil and private right, viz: the recovery 
of the possession of a certain class of personal 
property. A search and seizure granted for ·such 
purpose is clearly unreasonable, unconstitutional 
and void. 
In the ca:se of 
Yaeger v. State, 83 Southern 525, (Fla.), 
a search warrant was issued and the defendant 
arrested. The justice of the peace held a hearing 
and committed the defendant to the county court 
for trial. The defendant sued out a writ of habea8 
corpus. The statute 'va·s very similar to the one 
in question here and involved milk bottles. :An 
affidavit was filed by an agent of the Purity Ice 
;Cream & Dairy Company. The affidavit and the 
warrant specifically mentioned that the name 
"Purity" had been registered and the warrant 
directed the seizure of bottles with the word 
"Purity'·s" on it and directed the officer to bring 
the bottles and the person before the court. 
The statute in that case in addition to having 
the search and seizure provision, had ot1Jcr pro-
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visions similar to the other 'Sections or chapter 2, 
title 95 of the Utah statute. In holding tl1e act 
unconstitutional the Florida Supreme Court said: 
''The perfectly harmless and innocent act 
within itself, that of refilling a gla:ss 
bottle, is made penal by the statute merely 
because this statute prohibits it; yet the 
8ame statute penalizes the innocent act of 
refilling it only when and only 'SO long as 
the_ same bottle belongs to the highly 
favored class who have registered it. The 
moment the ownership of the bottle changes 
to that of another person or persons it 
may be filled and refilled ad libitum with-
out in the lea'St violating this or any other 
law.'' 
•'·We think this feature of the statute 
under consideration is an unjust and un-
reasonable legislative delegation to the 
claS'S of people who own a very common 
and ordinary class of personal property 
an attribute to that property, viz, Hs in-
hibited refillment, while and only so long 
as it remains their property.'' }?etitioner 
discharged. 
The particular type of search warrant statute 
as is involved herein has been befor~ the Supreme 
Courts of various State-s, and where a search and 
seizure has been involved, the statute has uniformly 
been held unconstitutional as being an unreason-
able search and ·seizure. 
In addition to the cases already cited, we re-
spectfully direct the Court's attention to the cases 
cited hereinafter in thi's brief, as they bear directly 
upon the question of the un~asonableness of such 
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a 3earch and seizure a:s involved herein, as well 
as upon matters discussed under subsequent 
headings. 
'rHE S~J1A'TUTE IN QUESTION VIOLATES 
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMI\IUNITIES 
AND ALSO THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSES OF THE UNI'rED sr:rATES CON-
STITUTION- IT IS SPECIAL AND CLASS 
LEGISLA'riON- NO QUES'rlON OF PO-
LICE POWER IS INVOLVED. 
One of the earlier cases involving a question 
of a search and seizure in connection with a con-
tainer law, was the case of 
Lippman v. People, 51 N. E. 872. 
That was a case which came before the Supreme 
Court of Illinoi·s. 
Upon an affidavit filed by the Gottfried Brew-
jug Company, a search and seizure warrant was 
1issued by a justice of the peace in Cook County 
directing the officers to search defendant's prem-
ises and seize and bring before the justice 400 beer 
bottles and 40 casks, harrels1 etc., having the mark 
of the company on them and to arrest and bring 
the defendant before the court. Lippman was 
convicted of using the 1narked bottles .and appealed. 
In speaking of the powers given under the search 
warrant provisions of the act and also of the ben-
efits given by the act with regard to regi8tering 
their trade marks and the protection arising there-
from, the Supreme Court stated: 
"It confers upon them (owners of the 
brand) the power to call upon the State 
and its officers and the judiciary to act as 
colJectors of thejr bottles, kegs~ and boxes 
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which they haYe voluntarily scattered over 
the State among their customers. It 
attempts to place at their disposal the 
extraordinary right of the search war-
rant, by which they may arm a constable 
or other officer with process to intrude 
upon the pre1nises or the home of any 
citizen to reco\er their bottle'S, kegs and 
the like. . . . It seen1s that the peculiar 
benefits, advantages, and rights conferred. 
by this act upon the persons named in it, 
and the right to employ an unusual remedy 
for the reco\ery of their property, must 
be classed as prinleges . . . . '' 
The Court in discussing the ,question of search 
and seizure stated further : 
"The purpose of this act, passed in behalf 
of the persons 'named in it, is not to re-
cover bottles stolen, embezzled, or fraud-
ulently obtained by false tokens or pre-
tenses, but to rru1.ke the proceedings 'under 
it, .as to su.ch persons, a substitute for the 
action of replevin. The general search 
warrant law of the State covers all the 
caBes just mentioned, and was on our 
statute book when this act was passed. 
There are and were general laws in force, 
applicable uniformly to all persons in the 
State, for the recovery of per'Sonal prop-
erty wrongfully obtained by another. This 
law was needless for that purpose, and it 
could only have been passed to give to the 
particular persons named in it addi tiona} 
privileges, by making the criminal law 
supersede the writ of replevin. The plain 
purpose of the act is to make the officers 
of the State detectives, searchers for and 
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collectors of beer bottles, be,er kegs, and 
the like. It is for a mere private benefit, 
having no relation to the police_ power or 
the protection of the public against frauds 
or injurious preparations; since, if the 
brewer or dealer consents, the bottles or 
kegs may be refilled with any sort of drink 
different from the marks, and it will be no 
offense under the act, however inj'urious 
to the public . . . . The public has no 
rights under it, and neither the title nor 
any provision indicates any public. pur-
pose." (Italics ours). 
After the statute involved in the Lippman 
case wa·s declared unconstitutional, parties inter-
ested secured the passage of a new act by the legis_ 
lature of Illinois in an attempt to obviate the 
objections of the earlier act but to accomplish the 
•same result and that second act. came before the 
Supre1ne Court of Illinois in the case of 
Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Labo:r.atory 
Company, 68 N. E. 938. 
·When that act came before the Court it wa:s argued 
that its purpose was to protect the public and 
manufacturers of food products from frauds and 
imitations and to prevent the public from being 
deceived in the use of adulterated foods. 
The same claim might he made in the case at 
bar but in view of the provisions of chapter 10 of 
title 3, Revised Statutes of 1933, we cannot see 
:how any one could ·seriously contend for that posi-
tion in this case. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
in answering the contention stated, (at page 940): 
''. . . . Neither thf\ title nor the lang-uage 
of the act shows evidence of any such pur-
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po·se. The law is entirely silent in regard 
to the quality of the commodity that may 
be sold in the receptacles by the owner or 
by the person to whom the owner may have 
given his written consent to use or buy 
the receptacle. There is no provision that 
the person who has purchased one of these 
receptacles with the written consent of the 
owner shall only put therein food pro-
ducts of as high a standard as those man-
ufactured by the original owner of the 
receptacle (by which term we de·signate 
the owner whose registered mark of owner-
ship appears on the receptacle), or that 
the food placed therein shall be of any 
particular standard of purity . . . . '' 
'' \\T e have examined this ·statute in vain 
for the purpose of finding any evidence 
that it was intended by the legislature to 
apply particularly to food products. The 
only thing that could possibly be construed 
as any evidence on that score is the fact 
that it describes receptacles in which food 
might be sold; but it will be observed that, 
in the list of these receptacles, cans, boxes, 
kegs, and barrels, are included containers 
in which gunpowder, boots, and shoe's, 
nails, lime, and an innumerable number of 
other articles of merchandise are habitual-
ly inclosed and sold. A patient considera-
tion of the provisions of this statute leads 
us to the conclusion that its purpose, like 
that of the earlier statute, was to facil-
itate the recovery of certain kinds of per-
sonal property, to 'Wit, the receptacles 
described in the first section of this statute, 
which have passed from the possession of 
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the owners thereof to others, and U'hich 
the owners desire to recover summarily. 
The act is wholly for the benefit ot the 
owners of personal property of this class, 
and is designed to give to the owners of 
personal property of this cbass rights and 
privileges not possessed by the owners of 
other classes of personal property." 
(Italics ours). 
"It is argued that this law should be sus-
tained under the police power of the State. 
It ha·s been frequently said by this Court 
that where a statute is referable to that 
power it must appear that it tends in some 
degree towards the pr:_evention of offenses 
or the preservation of the public health, 
mor~a.Zs, safety, or welfare . . . . (Cases 
cited). It cannot be contended that the 
selling or usingl of any of the-se recep-
tacles in the manner prohibited by this 
statute, viz., without the written consent 
of the owner, is in any manner more in-
jurious to the public health, morals, 
safety or welfare than if the smne things 
be done with the written consent of the 
owner. The written consent of the owner 
is no guaranty to the public that any wrong 
which it is in the power of the purcha:ser, 
possessor, or user of the receptacles in 
question to do the public will not be 
done." (Italics ours). 
At page 942: 
'' . . . . this legislation concerns the own-
ers of personal property. It attempts to 
legislate for the benefit only of the owners 
of such personal property as is named in 
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this act, and i8 therefore legislation con-
ferring special rights ~md privileges upon 
a portion only of the owners of personal 
property. There is no reason that sug-
ge-8ts itself to our n1inds, and none has 
been suggested by counsel, why such own-
ers should be entitled to this special pro-
tection, or why they should be considered 
a class by themselves, so that legislation 
for their benefit alone would not be ob-
noxious to the Constitution. . . . '' 
•' . . . They ·stand on the same footing as 
other owners of personal property, and any 
law favoring them above others, for the 
reason alone that they own personal prop-
erty of the kind specified in this act, is a 
special law, within the meaning o'f our 
Constitution.'' 
In the case of 
State v. Sch~rmck, 83 N. E. 797, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio had a "bottl~ law" 
before it for consideration. The defendant was 
indicted and charged with use of bottles of seven 
different beverage bottling companies. The Ohio 
Court in disposing of the que·stion, stated (p. 800): 
"It is manifest that the general public has 
not been offended by the commission of the 
acts alleged in the indictment, nor does the 
·statute in question make criminal any act 
in which the general public is concerned. 
" 
''The statute is not aimed at the adultera-
tion of any merchandise, food, or bever-
age, nor does it appear from its terms 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
that a compliance with it will tend to pre-
vent adulteration, or secure to the public 
pure 'merchandise,' pure 'food,' or pure 
'beverage·s.' Its sole purpose seems to be 
the protection of the owners of certain de-
scribed articles of personal property, who 
are engaged in a limited line of business, 
and the act might well be entitled 'An aet 
to protect persons engaged in the ·selling 
of any merchandise, food or beverages in 
bottles or other vessels from the loss of 
their bottles or other vessels.' Thrs pur-
pose pervades every line of the statute, in-
cluding the provision for search and ·seiz-
ure, and it is given crilninal caste in order 
to secure to such owners a. better prote0-
tion than is or perhaps oon be afforded t9 
owners of any other class of property. As 
to the recovery of other kinds of property 
by the lawful owner, he must rely on pro-
ceedings in a civil action; but here the 
State of Ohio is to become the plaintiff, 
and in a drastic criminal procedure, not 
only 'get at' the property for the ,owner 
and restore it, but to punish by fine or im-
prisonment, or both, the person who ha:s 
trespassed upon the title or possession of 
the owner. To aid in the work of pro'Becu-
tion, the premises of the accused may be 
searched on a warrant for that purpose, 
and the entire machinery of this statute 
exalts this ·species of property above all 
others. The owners of such bottles, ves-
sels, land their contents, mostly various 
kinds of beverages, are not left to civil 
remedies to which owners of other goods 
must resort in order to maintain their 
rights, but they may invoke the sovereign 
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power of the State mul its most command-
ing processes to s~.-we them from the loss of 
bottle and box. 
• 'It is difficult to concei,ye of a clearer 
ca'Se of class legislation in favor of cer-
tain dealers who have the ordinary means 
of reclaiming their property available to 
other citizens~ plus the criminal pro-
cedure of the State to not only reclaint but 
to punish. '" e ha\e not yet fully stated 
the entire character of this legislation. 
It is part of 'Section 4364-43 that 'the re-
quiring, · taking, or accepting of an) de-
posit for the return of any such stamped 
or designated bottle or \essel, or cover or 
stopper or attachment belonging to same, 
or box or receptacle used for handling or 
transportation of same, or the demanding 
or accPpting of any compensation for the 
nonreturn of any such property shall not 
be deemed a 'Sale of such property, either 
optional or otherwise, in any proceeding 
under this act.' Therefore the owner who 
·sells food or beverages in bottles or other 
vessels may take a deposit to secure the 
return of his bottle or vessel, or he may 
demand and accept compensation for 
their nonreturn, yet he still owns the 
property, for such acceptance shall not be 
deemed a sale either optional or other-
wise. In other words, the owner may de-
mand and accept a sufficient deposit to 
secure him, or he may demand and accept 
full compensation for the nonreturn of his 
bottles or other vessels, yet he still owns 
them, and may prosecute the party found 
in pos·sps;3ion through sale or otherwise, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
without the written consent of the owner. 
rl,he possession, with the verbal consent of 
the owner, will not protect, for a written 
consent must be ·shown. 
"A careful examination of this statute 
warrant8 the statmnent that innocent per-
sorrs may come into possession of such 
articles - persons out of the counly 
where the publication prescribed has been 
made and who had no knowledge thereof 
- and yet his premises may be ·searched 
on warrant, property seized, and such 
person, by fact of such posse'ssio.n, con-
fronted with a prima facie case against 
him. The posses·sion without the written 
consent of the owner becomes a crime, if 
a prescribed publication is made; if no 
publication, no crime. The State has not 
convinced us that ·such a statute should be 
upheld. We are told in the brief that 
several States of the Union have enacted 
similar laws, and that in two or more ·such 
States the law has been held valid by the 
courts of last resort. We have not the 
space for a comparison of the statutes of 
the various States named in the brief. It 
would ·surprise us somewhat if any State 
has enaeted a law containing all the char-
acteristics of the one before us. If pre-
cisely s1tch legislation is found elsewhere 
it tends to prove the assiduity of persons 
who are engaged in similar occupations in 
those jurisdictions.'' (Italics ours). 
We have already referred to the general stat-
utes a·s they appear in the Revised Statutes of 
1933, with respect to regulations for sanitation, 
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adulteration of food products, etc. These statutes 
appear as Chapter 54 of Title 105, Chapter 10 of 
Title 3, and particularly Sections 8, 22 and 33 
thereof, ~ogether with other sections in Title 3. 
These statutes, it seems, would be a complete an-
swer to any contention that this amended Section 
95-2-10 would have any reference to police po"\ver 
or morals. There is the further fact that this search 
and seizure i~ allowed for the recoYery of contain-
ers only where the trade marks on those contain-
ers have been registered. Is there any reason that 
J1as any relation to police power or morals, why the 
~)ublic hedth and welfare would be better served 
by allowing a search warrant in favor of an in-
dindual who had filed a trade mark. and refusing 
a search warrant for an individual who had a trade 
mark by which he could just as well identify his 
container, but had failed to file it 1 D_oes the 
registering of a mark tend in any manner to pro-
mote better 'Sanitation, or the production and dis-
tribution of purer foods T There can scarcely be 
any contention that this would be the case in face 
of Section 11 of the same statute, which allows 
possession of the containers to be transferred with-
out restriction, by a mere writing. from the owner. 
In the case of 
State v. Wiggam, 118 N. E. 684, 
the Supreme Court of Indiana had under consid-
eration a similar "bottle law." It was contended 
there that the law violated the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Constitution, and also the 
clause requiring laws to be general and of uniform 
operation. In holding the law invalid~ the Supreme 
Court of Indiana stated : 
''The legislature must classify in nearly 
every act which it pas·ses but there must be 
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a reason for the classification based on the 
public health, public morals or public wel-
fare. What is reasonable must be a judicial 
que·stion; oth~rwise the limitations in the 
Constitution are meaningless; and the legis-
lature is omnipotent in the legislative field.'' 
''The 'privileges and immunities' section, 
the 'cla·ss' section, and the 'general law' 
section, are not violated, if the act is rea-
sonably designed to protect the health, 
morals or welfare of the public.'' 
"The State contends that this act is de-
signed to protect the public against fraud 
in the use of containers bearing a name 
or trade-mark, but it is not shown that the 
public may be protected if the owner gives 
his 'written consent' or 'sell's' the contain-
ers to another. The persons buying them, 
or obtaining such consent, may, so far as 
this act is concerned, defraud the public all 
he pleases. The State says that this act 
also protects the public health against in-
ferior food products. 'Cans, kegs and 
barrels' :rp.ay contain nails, dynamite, or 
lime. So far as this act is concerned the 
person who _complies with it may build up 
a reputation for a ·superior product, and 
collude with another to defraud the public 
by filling the containers with an inferior 
food or drink or anything else that they 
are designed to hold.'' 
"The State also contends that there is a 
public demand, and therefore a public 
necessity for such a law, and, in ·support of 
this, calls our attention to the fact that 30 
States have passed similar law;;;. This 
makes us circumspect to detect rem~on for 
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such laws b·ut does not convince 'US that 
tkis u·as not brought about by the perni-
cious acfiPity of the self'ish . . . . '' 
(Italics ours). 
Let us look at our statute, again, in view of 
the foregoing authorities. It will not be contended 
.by the defendants that the law applies merely to 
refillable glass bottles - that, clearly, would be a 
special law. It applies to ''any receptacle, con-
tainer, carrier, box, equipment or supplies'' bear-
ing a brand or mark "claim to which has been 
filed and published a'S provided by law" - that 
is, a mark which has been registered and filed with 
the Secretary of State. 
It is a well-known fact, which we think will 
not be disputed, that numerous ''receptacles, con-
tainers, carrier'S, boxes, equipment and supplies'' 
of many kinds are in use generally with the pub-
lic. Many of these receptacles, containers, boxes, 
etc., bear various marks or brands and not aU of 
those marks or brands are registered or filed with 
the Secretary of State. The petitioner has, on 
various occasiorrs, used refillable glass bottles 
which bore some mark or identifying brand, but 
those marks or brands were not registered or filed 
with the Recretarv of State. No matter how many 
different kindf', ~f "rece'Ptacles, !containers, car-
riers, boxe-s'' etc., may be in use, and may be dis-
tributed around among the public, and no matter 
how many identifying marks or brandS! may be 
used by various individuals upon their boxes, con-
tainers equipment and supplies, etc., under this Act, 
those individuals who have registered and filed 
their inark or brand with the Secretary of State, 
can have the State officials and the criminal author-
Hies of the State, institute search warrant 'Pro-
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ceedings for the recovery of their receptacles, con-
tainers, boxes, equipment, etc., while other individ-
uals, using the same identical type of box or con-
tainer or equipment, even though he may have an 
identifying brand upon it, can not have the State 
authorities recover his property for him by search 
and seizure merely because he has not filed and 
.regi·stered his mark or brand with the Secretary of 
State. 
The ,petitioner, who has at various times used 
bottles with unregistered marks or brands on 
1them, is not entitled to the help of the State and 
it's criminal authorities, and is not entitled to in-
·voke the use of the search and seizure warrant to 
recover bottles he could identify, merely because 
he has not registered and .filed any mark or brand. 
But petitioner, and others similarly ·situaited, are 
left to their remedy by replevin, and must stand 
the. expense of it themselves, and will be required 
to put up a replevin bond to guarantee that they 
will not direct the sheriff to take pos·session of 
property, the possession of whidh they are not 
ju~tly entitled to. Other dairies and distributors 
are allowed to use the State and its criminal author-
itie·s, and the -criminal procedure of a search and 
seizure warrant, to recover th~ir property, merely 
because they have registered and filed their mark 
or brand with the Secretary of State. 
It is difficult for petitioner to see how any 
case could present a more patent violation of the 
\Privileges and immunities clause of the Federal 
Constitution. It is difficult for petitioner to see 
how any other conclusion could be reached than 
that this statute denies to petitioner, and others 
similarly situated, the equal protection of u~E' laws 
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as granted to him by the United States Constitu-
tion, and the Constitution of this State. 
It is clearly a case of special and class legis-
lation, enacted solely for the purpose of granting 
to that group or class of individuals who file and 
register their marks, privileges not extended to 
others similarly situated, merely because those 
others have not filed and registered their brands. 
It may be argued by defendants that the pro-
nsion for filing and registering their mark is 
merely one for identification purposes. We hard-
ly think, howe\er, that defendants will contend with 
much 'Seriousness, or that this Court would take 
the view that it would be very difficult in the usual 
case for an indindual to identify properly as his, 
when it has his name or brand on, even though 
that brand is not registered and filed; or, that the 
mere filing and registering of a mark or brand 
contained on a box, container, or receptacle, etc., 
would make it ea'Sier to identify that container, 
than \\Ould be the case with the same container 
hearing the same brand but not registered. 
It may also be contended that the purpose of 
the statute is to protect registered trade marks 
and trade names; and it is true that Title 95 is 
headed ''Trade ~I arks and Trade Names.'' But 
other provisions of Title 95 provide for the pro-
tection of trade marks and trade names, and Sec-
tion 10 of Chapter 2, either as originally framed 
or as amended by the 1939 Laws, was unneoessary 
for that purpo·se, and was only put on the statute 
books for the purpose of facilitating the recovery 
of certain types of personal property for the ben-
efit of a limited group or class of people .. This 
i::; further borne out by the very words o:fi the. Title 
of the Act pa:ssed by the 1939 Legislature, as it 
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appears at Page 144, Chapter 110, Session Laws of 
1939. That title, as it refers to Section 10, reads: 
" .... Providing for the issuance of 
·search and seizure warrants and the pro-
cedure thereon for the recovery of any such 
containers, oorriers, or equipment, anu for 
the summary adjudication of the o"'ner-
ship of any thereof seized upon warrant. 
" 
'fhus, the whole title and purpose of the Act 
aR involved herein rshows merely that it is 1the 
extension of the criminal procedure and remedy 
of the search and seizure warrant to the mainten-
ance of a purely civil and private right: that of the 
recovery of the possession of a certain type of per-
sonal property for a limited and favored group or 
cla·ss of individuals, where' no reasonable or 
logical basis for classification exists, and where 
no question of public health, safety, or morals i·s 
in any manner involved. 
DUE PROCESS 
In the prior action filed by petitioner, attack-
ing Section 10 as it appeared in the 1933 Revised 
Statutes, we contended that the statute violated 
the due process clarrse because no proviS:ion was 
made in that statute for notice or £or a hearing in 
connection with the disposition of the property 
seized on the search warrant. Apparently that ob-
jection wa·s considered sound by our legislators be-
cause in the amendment as passed by the 1939 
Legislature, provision is made that after return of 
the property seized by the officer, pursuant to the 
warrant, ''the court ·shall thereupon gtive noticP 
of a hearing to be held to determine the right to 
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the possession of said property.'' Then follow 
further provisions with respect to how is'Sues are 
to be frcuned and parties brought into this hear-
ing with respect to tl1e posse'Ssion of the property. 
It may be contended by the defendants that this 
sufficiently answers the requirements of the due 
proce-ss clause of the Constitution. 
\Y e think the amendment does not avoid the 
objection on t11e grounds of due process, because 
of the fact that the search and seizure warrant, 
according to the terms of Section 10, is and must 
be based upon and issued upon an affidavit, and 
that it must be stated in the affidavit that these 
receptacles are ''in the pO'ssession of any person 
other than the owner thereof, in violation of the 
provisions of any statute.'' Thus, as a basis of 
thE: iS"suance of this search and seizure warrant, 
there must be a statement in the affidavit which 
in effect may be somewhat in the nature of a 
ch2..rge, against the possessor, of the commi'Ssion 
of a crime, amounting to a misdemeanor, that is, 
that he has poS"session of these receptacles in vio-
lation of the provisions of the statute. Although 
this is contained in the section as the nece·ssary 
basis upon which the search and seizure warrant 
is i·ssued, the hearing that is provided by Section 
10 is not a hearing with respect to whether the pos-
sessor has violated any of the provisiorrs of the 
statute, but merely a hearing with respect to the 
ciril right of possession after the officer has thP. 
receptacles in his possession. If it is necessary to 
charge one in possession of such property with 
having possession thereof in violation of statute, 
in order to warrant the issuance of the 'Search and 
seizure writ, there should be provided, in order to 
constitute due process, a notice and hearing with 
respect to whether or not the pos·sessor has the 
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possession of the property in violation of s:tatut~. 
No provision for a notice and hearing in that re-
spect i·s made by the statute. 
There is a further defect in Section 10 and 
that is with respect to the hearing as scheduled. 
It is stated: 
"The Court shall then proceed to the trial 
of the i·ssues as made.'' 
No right of trial by jury is given, and no right of 
appeal is given. 
Because of these defects in the statute as 
amended, we think that the amendment did not ob-
viate the objection that the statute violated the due 
proces·s clause of the Constitution of the United 
States, and of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
The statute, itself, is not consistent as i's shown 
by the fact that the charge upon which lthe search 
~warrant is iS'sued is based upon.. one theory - that 
of a violation of statute - and the hearing that is 
scheduled upon the return of the search warrant is 
upon an entirely different theory, towit: that of 
a question merely of a civil right to possession of 
property. 
REQUIREMENTS OF 
WHICH SEARCH 
BASED. 
AFFIDAVIT UPON 
AND SEIZURE IS 
The main basis of the Court's decision in the 
prior action, in declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional, was that it allowed a search and seizure 
warrant to be issued upon an affidavit 1nade Inere-
ly upon information and belief. By the amend-
rnent it was sought to correct this defect, but the 
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statute still states that any person may 1nake affi-
davit ''that he ha'S reason to believe and does be-
lieYe,'' and then adds the requirement that" there 
must be a ''setting forth t11e facts upon which such 
belief is based.'' EYen though the facts upon 
which the information and belief is based mav be 
set forth, the affidavit is still one based, cle~rly, 
upon information and belief. The requirement 
should ha\e been tl1at there be set forth facts 
from which the court could find probable cause for 
such belief, but that requirement was not placed in 
the amendment. Also, the statute does not place 
the burden upon the Court or~ Justice to find that 
there is probable cause. It states 
"if it shall appear from the affidavit and 
depositions that there is probable cause to 
believe . . . . the Court shall issue a search 
and seizure warrant for such property.'' 
It may be argued that this requires the Court to 
find probable cause, but that is not necessarily the 
.result of the language. It does not state that the 
Court is the one to determine probable cause, and 
it does not state that the facts set forth in the 
affidavit must show probable cause. Petitioner, 
therefore, que-stions whether the difficulty with 
respect to the affidavit was obviated by the 
amendment. 
RIGHT TO ACQUIRE, POSSESS AND ENJOY 
PROPERTY. 
In 12 American Jurisprudence, section 505, 
page 187, we read: 
''Part of the liberty of a citizen consists 
in the enjoyment upon terms of equality 
with all others in ·similar circumstances, 
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of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary 
calling or trade and of acquiring, holding 
and selling property.'' 
See also 
11 American Jurisprudence, page 1145, 
section 335, 
where the constitutional right to acquire, possess 
and enjoy property is discussed. See also 
Gillespie v. People, 58 N. E. 1007. 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,62 L. Ed. 
149, and 
rr,errace v. 11hompson, 263 u. s. 197, 68 
L. Ed. 255. 
Property is more than the mere thing which a 
person ovms. It includes the right to acquire, use 
and dispose of it and the rights to life, liberty and 
property and equal protection includ~, -,the right 
freely to buy and sell a·s others may and the right 
to contract and to acquire property. The author-
ities are numerous to this effect and for that rea-
son plaintiff will omit any citation thereon except 
to quote the following from the case of 
Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Laboratory 
Company, supra, wherein the Court 
stated: 
''There is no reason which can set th~ legis-
lative police power of the State in motion 
for placing in a ·statute a provision that the 
seller or bailer must give to the buyer or 
bailee his written consent to buy or use an 
article of personal property sold or bailed. 
The manner in which the acquiescence of 
the seller or bailer in ·such a transaction 
shall be evidenced is wholly for the par-
ties themselveR.'' 
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The Court in that case went on to state that 
the evident purpose of the "Statute was 
''to so fully protect the original ow.ner 
whose registered marks 'of ownership 
appeared on the article, that' he should have 
to meet no evidence except evidence writ-
ten by himself, if an issue upon the ques-
tion of his consent arose 0 0 0 0 ' ' 
''The legislature has no authority to pro-
nounce the performance of an i,nnocent act 
criminal, when the public health, safety, 
comfort or welfare is not interferred 
with.'' 
With these and oth€r considerations, the 
lllinois Court did not he"Sitate to hold the statute 
unconstitutional 
The requirements of Section 95-2-11 of this 
statute are that ownership can not be transferred 
except by writing, and the defendants charge by 
their answer that plaintiff has been trafficking in 
bottles. Yet, at the same time, the various dairies 
interested in this trade mark statute, and who use 
trade marked bottles, exchange possession of their 
bottles daily with customers, without even the sug-
gestion of a verbal agreement; and they allow those 
customers to trade their bottles at stores and witb 
other dairies, and then thase same dairies pick up 
bottles bearing brands other than their own, take 
them to the bottle exchange and receive a ... con-
sideration from the bottle exchange for them, and 
pay to the bottle exchange a consideration for the 
return of their own bottles brought there by other 
<tmries. That constitutes trafficking in bottle-s as 
much as petitioner's practices. These ~same dairies 
deliver their bottle·s to customers without even a 
verbal agreement on behalf of their customers that 
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the customers shall be responsible for the bottles. 
and yet they attempt, under the terms of this 
statute, to make third parties to whom the custom-
ers may transfer the possession of those bottles, 
criminally liable under Chapter 2 of Title 95, and 
subject to having their homes or other property 
entered by virtue of a search and seizure warrant. 
We believe that thi·s is extending, criminal proced-
ure too far, and extending the search warrant 
much farther than precedent allows. 
This is not the first time that the matter of 
the possession and use of branded milk bottles by 
dairies other than the one claiming the brand has 
been before this Court. In the case of 
Clover Leaf Dairy Company v. Van Gerven, 
72 Utah 290, 267 Pacific 1020, 
1an injunction was sought against the use of branded 
bottles by another dairy. :The trial court granted 
the injunction and this Court reversed the lower 
court and directed that the injunction and the1 action 
he dismissed and this Court in suggesting a remedy 
to the dairy <'stated, (at page 297) : 
'' . . . . They can commence now to do 
what we have ·suggested they should have 
done when they first put their trade-
marked bottles jn circulation. They can 
contract with their customers to return 
their trade-marked bottles or be respon-
sible therefor. When they have once estab-
lished that custom, their trade-mark will 
be of some value. It will be prima facie 
evidence of ownership, and the traffic in 
bottles bearing their trade-marks will 
either cease or be done at the peril:'of those 
who engage in the traffic.'' 
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Until the 8Uoaogestion given by this Court with 
regard to requiring customers to be responsible for 
the return of trade-marked bottles is complied with 
various bottles will continue to be indiscriminately 
pa'Ssed from one person to another and one concern 
to another by the public and as long as that prac-
tice continues, no person, whether a dealer in milk 
J>roducts or otherwise, should be subjected to such 
a 'Search and seizure as is provided for by this 
statute and as was done in this particular ca8e. 
Even an individual in a private home who fails or 
neglects to return bottle-s of various dairies which 
he may receive ·by trade with various stores could 
be subjected to having his home entered with a 
search and seizure warrant the same a:s any place 
of business could be entered with a search and 
seizure warrant under this section. 
One of the earliest cases upon the subject is 
the case of 
Robinson v. Richardson, a Massachusetts 
case. reported in 13 Gray 454, 
in which the Court reviews a little of the history 
regarding search warrants and states that they 
should be used only for the purpose of suppression 
of crime or detection and punishment of criminals. 
This case together with lengthy excerpts from the 
opinion, is quoted by Justice Cooley in the 8th edi-
tion of his work on 
Constitutional Limitations, Volume 1, page 
626, at which place Judge Cooley also 
concludes : 
"We think it would generally be safe for 
the legislature to regard all those searche·s 
and seizures 'unreasonable' which have 
hitherto been unknown to the law, and on 
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that account to abstain from authorizing 
them, leaving partie·s and the public to the 
accustomed remedies.'' 
We think that in the matter involved in this 
case that the owners of the trade-marked recep-
tacles taken on the search and seizure should be 
left to thei1· t:Jcveral remedies of claim and delivery 
if they wish to recover their property or to the 
remedy by injunction if they want to restrain an-
other from the use thereof and that the statute and 
proceeding!J'~fr~d;~~s had and as contemplated 
'before ij};; J ~~~t. ,..~f~] 1 noa by the said ~JudJe 
qf 11 : p1 ilia? and the said other defendants are 
entirely unwarrantable, unconstitutional, illegal 
and void. 
NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW 
The application was made by plaintiff and the 
·writ sought herein by plaintiff because the remedy 
at law '\va·s entirely inadequate. In the case of 
People v. Spears, 4 Utah 385, 
this Court held that if a justice of the peace was 
proceeding in excess of the jurisdiction held by 
him, an appeal was neither a speedy or adequate 
remedy and that prohibition would lie. 
See also Allen v. Lindbeck, supra. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the demurrer 
of defendants should be overruled and the alter-
native writ of prohibition made permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURM-AN & MIN.ffiR, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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